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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANK CORRIGAN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Witnesses-Examination by Court.-A trial judge has the 
right to examine witnesses. 
[2] Criminal Law-Appeal- Objections- Witnesses.-A judge's 
examination of a witness may not be assigned as error on 
appeal where no objection was made when the questioning 
occurred. 
[3] Witnesses-Examination by Court.-It is proper for a judge 
to question witnesses for the purpose of eliciting or clarifying 
testimony on material points. 
[4] Criminal Law-Course and Conduct of TriaL-It is the right 
and duty of a judge to conduct a trial in such manner that the 
truth will be established in accordance with the rules of evi-
dence. 
[5] Id.- Conduct of Judge- Questioning Witnesses.-The mere 
fact that the judge examined a witness at some length does 
not establish misconduct. 
[6] !d.-Conduct of Judge-Remarks.-It was not improper for 
the trial judge in a robbery case to state to a witness, while he 
was being questioned regarding the time defendant left a 
certain club, "Let's you and I be on the square with each other . 
. . . Don't forget I want you to tell me the truth," where in 
view of the witness' vague and inconsistent testimony on that 
point the judge merely wished to emphasize that the witness 
should weigh his answer carefully and be certain of its truth. 
[7] !d.-Conduct of Judge.-It was not error for the trial judge 
to intervene in a robbery case to ask defendant, while he was 
being cross-examined by the prosecutor with reference to his 
not being afraid of having a confessed participant in the rob-
bery called as a witness, whether he wished to call such par-
ticipant as a witness, where there was no reason for supposing 
that the judge intervened for any purpose other than to assure 
defendant that the confessed participant would be produced 
at the trial if defendant desired his testimony. 
APPJ<JAI, from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sac-
ramento County, and from an order denying a new trial. 
Raymond 'f. Coughlin, Judge. Affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, ~ 49; Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 557. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Witnesses,§ 92; [2] Criminal Law, 
§ 1075; [4] Criminal Law, § 264; [5] Criminal L:1w, § 327; [6] 
Criminal Law,§ 329(2); [7] Criminal Law, § 328. 
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Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first 
degree robbery, affirmed. 
Frank Corrigan, in pro. per., Robert \V. Cole, Public De-
fender (Sacramento), William D. Heekin, Assistant Public 
Defender, and Ralph D. Drayton, under appointment by the 
Supreme Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and G. A. Strader, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty of first de-
gree robbery, and he has appealed from the judgment of 
conviction and the order denying a new trial. 
The robbery occurred about 1 :25 a.m. on May 1, 1955, in 
a Sacramento bar called the King of Clubs. It was committed 
by two men whose faces were masked by women's stockings, 
and the shorter of the men held a gun and wore gloves, an 
overcoat and a hat. One of the robbers was Frederick Ash, 
who was arrested on May 2 and pleaded guilty when he was 
made a codefendant in this case. Defendant, whose first name 
is Frank, knew Ash, and, on May 6, a man who identified 
himself as "Frank" sought to reach Ash by telephone at the 
house where Ash rented an apartment. The landlady told 
the caller that Ash was out of town. Again on May 8, a man 
identifying himself as "Frank" telephoned and asked for 
Ash. The landlady's son answered the call and immediately 
telephoned his mother, who was visiting friends. \Vhen she 
came home about 15 minutes later, there was another tele-
phone call, which she answered, and the voice of the caller 
sounded like that of the man who had asked for Ash on May 
6. Immediately after and ''pursuant to'' the telephone call, 
the landlady and a friend went to Ash's apartment and "got" 
a locked green box. It contained, among other items, two 
purses, a wallet, a pair of women's stockings, an overcoat, a 
hat and a gun. 
The green box and its contents were turned over to the 
police and were introduced in evidence at the trial. The 
purses and the wallet were identified as property taken in 
the robbery, and the stockings were similar to those worn by 
the masked men. The overcoat and hat resembled the gar-
ments of the shorter robber, and the gun looked like the one 
whirh he used. Defendant's fingerprints were found on the 
gun, and an eyewitness to the robbery testified that defend-
ant was approximately the size of the man with the gun. 
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James Duran, an ex-convict who was arrested with defend-
ant in defendant's apartment on M:ay 8, testified that, twice 
during that day, Edward Dillon, another ex-convict who 
was present in the apartment, left to make telephone calls 
and that, when Dillon returned from making the second call, 
he told defendant that Ash was in jail. According to Duran, 
defendant then said that the "heat was on" and that "I hope 
you guys got sense enough to get rid of that box because in 
the box was the stockings and the gun and these fingerprints 
were all over it.'' 
Defendant took the stand and denied participating in the 
robbery. He claimed that, on the night in question, he did 
not see Ash and that he was in a night club called the Sapphire 
Club from shortly before 1 a.m. until about 2 a.m., except 
that, at 1 :10 or 1 :20, he went across the street to another 
night club for five or ten minutes. By way of explaining 
the fact that his fingerprints were on the gun used in the 
robbery, defendant stated that he handled the weapon while 
being questioned by the police. However, two officers who 
conducted the interrogation testified that defendant did not 
touch the gun when it was shown to him. The evidence is 
sufficient to support the verdict. 
Defendant seeks to reverse the judgment, claiming that he 
was prejudiced by questions which the judge asked three 
defense witnesses and by a statement of the judge that he 
would order Ash, who was then in jail, to be brought into 
court if defendant wished to call him as a witness. 
Rheba Boyd, a waitress at the Sapphire Club, testified that 
she had breakfast with defendant about 2 a.m. on the night 
of the robbery and that defendant had been in the club 
during the preceding hour and a half. In cross-examining the 
witness, the prosecutor asked why she had not previously 
given this information to the authorities, and she answered, 
''Well, why should I? . . . A lot of people had seen him 
there that night, and should they all come up to the Police 
Department and tell them?'' In reply to further questions 
on the subject, she said that, although she knew that her 
information, if believed, would "clear'' defendant, she did 
not "think of it that way," and that she knew that defendant 
could not have committed the crime but that she did not "do 
anything about it." The judge interrupted and questioned 
the witness as follows : 
THE CoURT: Let me ask you this. You became quite con-
cerned there when you were asked why you didn't go to the 
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authorities and tell them. Why didn't you go to the authori-
ties and tell them that you knew where Corrigan was that 
night 1 I don't want anything that a lot of other people saw 
him. They haven't come up and testified to it, but you have. 
Tell us why you didn't go. If you knew this man was inno-
cent, why did you wait until today to tell this Court where 
he was charged or to tell the District Attorney or the Chief 
of Police 1 Why did you wait until today? 
A. Well, actually this Jack Travis, this bartender I was 
going with, he didn't want me to get involved anyway or 
anything. 
THE CouRT : Yon mean that the bartender was the one 1 
Who is Jack Travis 1 
A. The fellow I was going with. 
THE CouRT: Where is he 1 Does he know anything about 
this? 
WITNESS: No. 
THE CouRT: Well, all right. Now tell me, why, if you knew 
that this man was innocent, if you knew he was innocent, why 
did you wait until today¥ Give me your answer. You say it 
was your friend 1 
WITNESS: Well, I thought if he needed me he would cer-
tainly get in touch with me. 
THE CoURT: Did anybody ever get in touch with you? 
WITNESS: Mr. Cayocca [defendant's attorney) is the only 
one. 
THE CouRT: All right, then what happened 1 Why didn't 
you go after you talked to Mr. Cayocca 1 
WITNESS: He didn't suggest it. 
'l'HE CouRT: Did he suggest that you don't go 1 
WITNESS : No, he did not. 
'fHE CouRT: Well, then what stopped you from going 1 
WITNESS: Actually, I don't-! don't know why I didn't 
go. Just never occurred to me. 
THE CoURT : Yon are here today. Aren't you 1 
WITNESS : Yes. 
THE CoURT: And you are here under a subpoena; isn't that 
right 1 
WITNESS: Yes. 
THE CouRT: When did you get that subpoena? 
WITNESS: About a week and a half ago. 
THE CouRT: All right. At that time you knew that yon 
were going to be brought into Court, didn't you 1 
WITNESS : Yes. 
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THE CouRT : Why didn't you then go to the District A ttor-
ney and tell him that you knew this man was innocent? 
WITNESS: \Vell, I don't know why, I just figured that I 
would have to be here today and that's all there was to it; 
I mean I just didn't think any more about it. 
THE CouRT: You never thought any more about it~ 
WITNESS: No. 
THE CouRT: Is that it? 
WITNESS : Yes. 
THE CoURT: Is that what you want to ten me? 
Vv ITNESS : Yes. 
THE CouRT: All right. Now then, who was this you said 
told you not to become involved in it? 
WITNESS: This Jack Travis I was going with him, and he 
was just a little jealous of Frank [defendant), that's all. 
THE CouRT: All right. And for that reason Jack Travis 
told you not to go and tell about it; is that it? 
'WITNESS: Well, he didn't say not to, but he said if you 
are not careful, he said, you may get a subpoena; that's all. 
THE CouRT: You told me he was jealous of Frank? 
·WITNESS: He was. 
THE CouRT: And is that the reason you mean to tell me 
that because he was jealous of Frank, that you would let a 
man be convicted of a crime of robbery because this bar-
tender told you not to go to the police? 
WITNESS: He didn't tell me not to go. 
THE CouRT: Well, why didn't you go? 
\VITNESS: Judge, I don't know why I didn't go. 
THE CouRT: All right. All right. 
[1] The right of a trial judge to examine witnesses is not 
disputed. (People v. Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 714, 721 [56 P.2d 193]; 
People v.JI,fendez, 193 Cal. 39, 46 [223 P. 65]; Bell v. Moloney, 
175 Cal. 366, 370-371 [165 P. 917]; People v. Candiotto, 128 
Cal.App.2d 347, 359-360 [275 P.2d 500] ; People v. Deacon, 
117 Cal.App.2d 206, 209 [255 P.2d 98]; People v. Flores, 113 
Cal.App.2d 813, 818 [249 P.2d 66] ; People v. Montgomery, 
47 Cal.App.2d 1, 18 [117 P.2d 437]; People v. Golsh, 63 Cal. 
App. 609, 615 [219 P. 456] .) Defendant argues, however, 
that, in questioning the witness, the judge improperly led the 
jury to infer that her testimony was not to be believed because 
she did not volunteer to give to the authorities the informa-
tion which she claimed to have with respect to defendant's 
whereabouts on the night the crime was committed. No ob-
jection was made to the questions asked of the witness by the 
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judge, nor did defendant make a motion to strike the ques-
tions or answers. [2] It is settled that a judge's examination 
of a witness may not be assigned as error on appeal where no 
objection was made when the questioning occurred. (People v. 
Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 714, 721 [56 P.2d 193]; People v. Bishop, 134 
Cal. 682, 686 [66 P. 976] ; People v. Deacon, 117 Cal.App.2d 
206, 208 [255 P.2d 98] ; People v. Flores, 113 Cal.App.2d 
813, 817 [249 P.2d 66]; cf. People v. Amaya, 40 Ca1.2d 70, 
78 [251 P.2d 324]; People v. Avery, 35 Cal.2d 487, 493 [218 
P.2d 527] .) If the rule were otherwise, a party could specu-
late on the verdict by deliberately failing to call the court's 
attention to a matter which could be remedied during the 
trial. We must assume that, had an objection been made, 
the judge would then have informed the jury that his pur-
pose in so questioning the witness was to establish facts 
which might affect her credibility, but that it was the exclu-
sive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the 
witness and the weight to be given her testimony. Such an 
instruction, given at the time the questions were asked, would 
have removed any danger that the jury might misunderstand 
the purpose of the examination. In this connection, it may 
be noted that the jury was instructed at the close of the case 
that it was the exclusive judge of the weight, value and effect 
of the evidence and of the credibility of the witnesses. 
Another of the witnesses whom the judge questioned was 
Nick Bakotich, who testified that he was with defendant be-
tween 10 p.m. and 2 a.m. on the night of the robbery. The 
prosecutor asked him a number of questions concerning what 
they did on that night and about other occasions when he 
had been with defendant. The judge interrupted the cross-
examination and continued the same general line of question-
ing at considerable length. The following portions of the 
record illustrate the matters complained of with respect to 
the judge's examination of this witness: 
THE CoURT: What other nights did you spend with him 1 
THE ·WITNESS: Oh, a couple of other occasions I met him 
uptown. 
THE COURT: Tell me the last night before the 30th. 
THE WITNESS: I guess it might have been around three, four 
days before. 
THE CoURT: Might have been three or four days. Tell me 
the last time you were with him before the 30th. You ougllt 
to know. You say you were there. Where were you with him 
the last time before the 30th~ And tell me how long you were 
with him that time and what you talked about? 
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THE CouRT: You don't know. You don't know, is that it"? 
Do you know or don't you know~ 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE CouRT: You don't know, is that right 1 
THE WITNESS: (Nodded affirmatively.) 
The judge later questioned Bakotich about his claim that 
a third man had been with him and defendant on the night 
of the crime: 
THE CouRT: Let's talk about this third person. \Vhat was 
his name? 
THE WITNESS: I don't know his name. 
THE CouRT: Don't you know his first name f 
THE WITNESS: Might have been Freddy, I think. I am not 
too sure. 
THE CouRT: Might have been Freddy. Freddy Ash? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE CouRT: It might have been Freddy. But you don't 
know whether it was Freddy Ash or not; is that righU 
THE WITNESS: No, I don't know the guy. 
THE CouRT: Why do you say it might have been Freddy 1 
THE WITNESS: Well, I think it might have been his name. 
I don't know. 
THE CouRT: Yon were with him from 9 :30 until 2 :00 
o'clock in the morning? 
THE WITNESS: That's right. 
THE CouRT: Is that right 1 And you don't--didn't even 
know his name 1 Were you ever with him before 1 
THE WITNESS: No sir. 
At another point, in response to a question by the judge as 
to the source of the money which Bakotich spent on the night 
of the robbery, the witness testified that his brother had 
given the money to him earlier that day. The judge said that 
the brother would be called to testify and that Bakotich 
should wait in the corridor until recalled to the stand. The 
brother did not testify, but Bakotich was recalled, and the 
prosecution resumed the cross-examination. The witness then 
testified that he wanted to change his testimony, that he had 
been trying to help defendant, that there was a chance that 
he was with defendant on the night of the robbery but that 
he was not sure, and that it was possible that it was some 
other night. On redirect examination it was established that, 
while Bakotich was waiting to be recalled to the stand, he was 
taken into the district attorney's office, where several men, 
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apparently detectives, talked to him about perjury. The judge 
examined Bakotich and inquired whether anyone had told 
him to change his "story." The witness gave a negative 
answer and testified that he had been told that giving false 
testimony would constitute perjury, a fact which he had not 
known previously. The judge then asked, ''As I understand 
your testimony ... up to that time you thought you could 
help Frank out; is that it~'' The witness replied, ''That's 
right." 
The third witness, of whose examination defendant com-
plains, was Michael Azzinaro, the bartender who was on duty 
at the Sapphire Club on the night in question. He testified 
that defendant left the club at 1 :15 a.m., returned about 1 :35, 
and stayed until closing time. When cross-examined about his 
testimony that defendant first left the club at 1 :15, he said, 
"The reason I say that is because he said, 'I'll see you later,' 
and I just happened to notice the time." He was asked if he 
could recall other persons who were in the club that night, 
and he testified that one was named Harry but that he could 
not remember at what time that customer left. At this point, 
the judge interrupted and questioned the witness as follows: 
THE CouRT : Let me ask you this, whenever anybody goes 
out, says, "I will see you later," do you always look at the 
time to see what time they leave~ 
WITNESS: Well, not exactly, but thirty-four years as a bar-
tender is a little experience, your Honor .... 
THE CouRT: All right. Now let me ask you this. How many 
other people left that night that you could tell us left at 1 :00 
o'clock, that you looked at the clock when they left 1 
\VrTNESS: I didn't look at the clock but I could tell you a 
few. 
THE CouRT: All right. But you did look at the clock when 
Corrigan left; is that it 1 
WITNESS: No, I didn't look at the clock. 
THE CouRT : Didn't you tell us you looked at the clock? 
WITNESS: But at 1:00 o'clock I did look at the clock and 
I spaced the time as fifteen minutes. 
THE CouRT: I see. As the time that he left 1 
WITNESS: Yes, I would say that at the time he left I spaced 
it at fifteen minutes. 
THE CouRT : How did you happen to do that 1 Why did you 
do that with him any different than anyone else? 
WITNESS: Well, I don't do it any different with anyone else, 
your Honor, it's just that I know the time some come in and 
some go out is all. 
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THE CoURT: Now isn't it a fact, let me ask you this and 
let's you and I be on the square with each other. 
WITNESS: Yes. 
THE CouRT: Do you definitely know what time Corrigan 
left there that night? Don't forget I want you to tell me 
the truth. 
WITNESS: Well, I am telling you the truth to the best of 
my knowledge. 
THE CouRT: All right, and you say at 1 :15. 
·WITNEss: Yes, I would say. 
There is no claim that the questions asked of Bakotich and 
Azzinaro constituted improper cross-examination as far as 
the subject matter was concerned. 'rhe position of defendant 
is that the length of the examination by the judge and some 
of the language which he used conveyed to the jury the im-
pression that he did not believe the witnesses. No ob-
jection was made to any of the questions, and, as we have 
seen, defendant cannot complain on appeal where, as here, 
any error could have been corrected, if a timely objection had 
been made. [3, 4] Moreover, we find no error in the question-
ing of these two witnesses. The judge was obviously seeking 
to elicit or clarify testimony on material points, and it is the 
right and the duty of a judge to conduct a trial in such a man-
ner that the truth will be established in accordance with the 
rules of evidence. (People v. Martinez, 38 Cal.2d 556, 564 
[241 P.2d 224]; People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 46 [223 P. 
65].) [5] The mere fact that the judge examined Bakotich 
at some length does not establish misconduct. (People v. 
Montgomery, 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 18 [117 P.2d 437) .) [6] Nor 
is there any merit in defendant's contention that the judge 
acted improperly in remarking to Azzinaro, "Let's you and 
I be on the square with each other .... Don't forget I want 
you to tell me the truth." This remark was made while 
Azzinaro was being questioned regarding the time defend-
ant left the Sapphire Club, and it seems clear that, in view of 
the witness' vague and inconsistent testimony on that point, 
the judge merely wished to emphasize that Azzinaro should 
weigh his answer carefully and be certain of its truth. 
[7] Finally, it is argued that the defendant was prejudiced 
by the judge's offer to have Ash, who was then in jail, brought 
into court if defendant wished to call him as a witness. On 
direct examination, defendant testified, in effect, that he was 
not afraid of having Ash called as a witness bee a use Ash's 
testimony, if truthful, would not harm defendant. During 
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cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, "And isn't it a fad, 
Mr. Corrigan, that the reason you are not afraid is that you 
know that Mr. Ash will get up there and say that you were 
not the man with him~" Defendant answered, "vVhy if he 
tells the truth, he will, sir." The following then occurred: 
THE CouRT: Do you want him [Ash] called as a witness? 
THE ·WITNESS: That's up to my attorney, sir. 
THE CouRT: Well it's up to you, too, I am asking you now, 
do you want him? I will order him here. 
THE vVITNESS: I don't care, sir, either way. 
THE CouRT: If you waut him, he is available. I will bring 
him here from prison if you want. 
MR. CA YOCCA [defense counsel] : vV ell, your Honor --
THE CouRT: If you want him, he is available for you. 
MR. CAYOCCA: Your Honor, from what has gone on before 
with some of these other fellows that testified, I have already 
advised Mr. Corrigan that I would not call Ash. 
THE CouRT: I don't understand what you mean by that. If 
you want him, I will order him here so he is available for you. 
There is no reason for supposing that the judge intervened 
for any purpose other than to assure defendant that Ash would 
be produced at the trial if defendant desired his testimony, and 
it was not error for the court to give defendant this assurance. 
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are 
affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-! do not agree that (p. 561 
supra, italics added) "it is the right and the duty of a judge 
to conduct a trial'' in the manner stated in the opinion or 
otherwise. People v. Martinez (1952), 38 Cal.2d 556, 564 
[241 P.2d 224], quoting People v. Mendez (1924), 193 Cal. 
39, 46 [223 P. 65], cited in the opinion, is not authority for 
the above quoted statement. The right or duty the Martinez 
case speaks of is ''to so sttpervise and regulate the course of 
a trial that the truth shall be revealed in so far as it may be, 
within the established rules of evidence." (Italics added.) 
To "supervise and regulate the course of a trial" is quite a 
different thing from assuming to himself "conduct a trial." 
The latter practice should be disapproved and diseouraged 
rather than approved and encouraged. 
A vice of the practice depicted by the record is that, 
however proper may have been the motive of the trial judge, 
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the effect of his intervention must almost certainly have 
tended to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. It tended to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial not merely because of 
the content and improper implications of some of the judge's 
questions and statements but because it must have appeared 
to the jury that the judge was throwing the prestige of his 
position to the support of the prosecution. Trial by jury 
means that issues of fact shall be resolved by the jury on the 
evidence under the law. On the record here, the influence 
of the judicial mien can well have been the deciding factor; 
such influence is not lawful evidence. 
For the reasons indicated above, and on the grounds more 
completely related in the opinion of Mr. Justice Peek, dis-
senting in the District Court of Appeal (reported in (Cal. 
App.) 302 P.2d 371, 385), I would reverse the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I concur in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Schauer 
in his dissenting opinion and, in addition, adopt the pertinent 
portions of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Peek of the 
District Court of Appeal (Cal.App.) 302 P.2d 371, 385. 
''. . . 'A trial judge is rigorously prohibited from actions 
or words having the effect of conveying to the jury his per-
sonal opinion as to the truth or falsity of any evidence. This 
rule should be strictly adhered to.' (People v. O'Donnell, 
11 Cal.2d 666 [81 P.2d 939] .) ... 
''From my reading of the transcript I cannot escape the 
conclusion that from the outset of the trial, by the persistent, 
aggressive and lengthy cross-examination of the witnesses, 
the context of the questions asked, the innuendoes contained 
therein, as well as the inferences to be drawn therefrom, and 
what amounted to voluntary comments contained in such 
questions, the trial judge definitely stepped out of his char-
acter as a judge and took over the role of the prosecutor. And, 
by such actions and words, he very forcefully conveyed to the 
jury his personal opinion as to the truth or falsity of the evi-
dence and the credibility of the witnesses. Although the 
majority opinion has quoted much of the extensive and 
repetitious examination of tl1e witnesses by the court, it 
seems to me that only by a reading of the entire transcript 
can the true effeet on the jury of sueh questioning be evalu-
ated .... [T]he interrogation by the eonrt, in addition to the 
portiom: quoted in the ma.iorit.y opinion, is replete with such 
comments and questions as : 
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"' You ought to know. You say you were there ... 
You don't know. You don't know, is that it? Do you know 
or don't you know 1 What joint were you in ... you say ... 
You guess ... Now you are telling us. Is that right? And 
you don't-didn't even know his name . . . f Might have 
been Freddy but you don't know whether it was Freddy 
or not, is that right? You just guess it was during April; 
is that right 1 You are not sure are you 1 Are you sure it 
was in April or you just say it must have been, you guess 1 ... 
All right, now let me ask you this ... You don't remember 
that very well? You don't know the date. Was it Saturday 
night, Sunday night, or do you know? Have you any idea 1 
. . . Who said 1 They said T Who are they¥' . . . 
''I cannot agree that the case was strong. The evidence 
concerning the identification of the two persons who partici-
pated in the robbery was entirely circumstantial. The testi-
mony of the bartender and the four bar patrons, some of 
whom had been at the bar for quite some time, was in complete 
confusion. Their only agreement was as to what clothing was 
worn by the two men; that is, the nylon stockings worn as 
masks, the overcoat, hat and gloves, and the similarity of the 
gun used with the one introduced at the trial. The defendant 
herein was never directly identified. His only connection 
with the robbery was established by reason of the fingerprints 
being found on the gun and certain conflicting statements 
made by two of the State's witnesses concerning comments 
said to have been made by defendant following two telephone 
calls to Ash's landlady. The landlady testified to one version 
and one of the paroled ex-convicts testified to another, and 
one which was different from his testimony at the preliminary 
hearing. Duran, the other ex-convict parolee who was called 
by the prosecution gave still another version. Again there 
was conflict as to whether it was Dillon or Corrigan who made 
statements such as: that the 'heat was on' when he was in-
formed that Ash was in jail; that he hoped that Ash had 
enough sense to do something with the box the police were 
said to have found; that there were stockings, gloves and other 
stuff in the box and fingerprints all over it. Corrigan denied 
that it was he who made such statements. But even assuming 
that he did, I do not eonsider sueh eomment can be interpreted 
either as an admission on his part of participation in the 
robbery or as an identification of the gun. No incriminating 
evidenee was found in the possession of Corrigan. The box 
was found in the attic of Ash's apartment. The fingerprints 
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found on the gun were not so placed as they would have been 
had the gun been held in a normal position. It was Corrigan's 
testimony that his fingerprints were left on the gun when he 
was asked to examine it at the police station. All of the 
witnesses testified that the robber who held the gun wore 
gloves at the time of the robbery. Thus the fingerprints must 
have been placed on the gun either before or after the robbery. 
The most that was said concerning the gun, by any of the 
witnesses, was merely that it was similar to the gun used at 
the time of the robbery. 
''. . . a trial is not a game in which the judge can only 
act as an umpire, and 'sit quietly by and see one wrongfully 
acquitted or unjustly punished.' (People v. Golsh, 63 Cal. 
App. 609, 614-615 [219 P. 456).) But it is equally true that 
he must not become a partisan advocate. Therefore when, 
during the examination of the witnesses, a court by words or 
actions departs from the role of an impartial judge and con-
veys to the jury 'his personal opinion as to the truth or falsity 
of any evidence' (11 Cal.2d 666, 671) and it could well be 
added, of the credibility of any witness, he has by so doing 
placed himself without the bounds of article VI, section 19. 
"No one will deny that jurors are most sensitive to and 
rely with great confidences on the fairness of judges and the 
correctness of their views expressed during the course of a 
trial. 'For this reason, and too strong emphasis cannot be 
laid on the admonition, a judge should be careful not to throw 
the weight of his judicial position into a case, either for or 
against a defendant.' (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 627 
[258 P. 607); People v. O'Donnell, 11 Cal.2d 666 [81 P.2d 
939] .) 
''Conviction or acquittal may equally be the result of a 
miscarriage of justice. In either event a fundamental right 
of the People or of the defendant has been disregarded or 
denied. It is an essential part of justice that the question of 
guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal 
procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging both to 
the People and the defendant shall be respected. (People v. 
Long, 63 Cal.App.2d 679 [147 P.2d 659].) 
''The situation as presented by the record before this court 
. . . convinces me that to approve the . . . error in this case 
is to deny a fair, impartial trial to the defendant and to extend 
the saving grace of section 4% just a bit too far." 
I would reverse the judgment and grant defendant a new 
trial. 
